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Abstract
People make decisions every day or form an opinion based on persuasion processes, whether through advertising, planning
leisure activities with friends or public speeches. Most of the time, however, subliminal persuasion processes triggered by
behavioral cues (rather than the content of the message) play a far more important role than most people are aware of. To
raise awareness of the different aspects of persuasion (how and what), we present a multimodal dialog system consisting
of two virtual agents that use synthetic speech in a discussion setting to present pros and cons to a user on a controversial
topic. The agents are able to adapt their emotions based on explicit feedback of the users to increase their perceived
persuasiveness during interaction using Reinforcement Learning.
Keywords Subliminal persuasion · Adaptive agents · Persuasive dialog system · Argumentation
1 Introduction
The communication of opinions, along with different pro-
and counter-arguments, is an important factor in the process
of opinion building. However, people tend to get persuaded
by far more than just the rational content of arguments. Pre-
senting content-wise identical arguments in different ways,
such as body language, appropriate gazing behavior as well
as emotions can have a different effect on the audience’s
opinion towards the argument and overall stance of the
topic [1, 4, 6] and, thus, the persuasive effectiveness of the
conveyed content [25]. Especially in public speeches and
political debates, it is not only important what is said (se-
mantic content), but also how something is said. Looking at
recent public speeches, especially by politicians, it appears
that people are more likely to be influenced by the behavior
or authority of speakers than by the content of the message
they convey. A prominent example is the controversially
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discussed Brexit, in which supporters have demonstrably
put forward arguments with questionable validity. For in-
stance, during the referendum campaign in 2016, it has been
claimed that remaining in the EU costs around £350 million
a week, which, however, disregards the fact that the UK had
been granted a rebate since 1984 [7]. Although it is difficult
to check what could have happened retrospectively if only
logically valid arguments had been used, it still seems that
people are not aware of the subliminal persuasive framing
caused by their own emotions and those of the speakers.
Within this article, we present the ongoing research
project EVA (Empowering Virtual Agents), in which we
aim to investigate two different persuasive aspects of argu-
mentation: (1) the effect of what is said and (2) the effect
of how something is said. Thus, our approach includes
logical argumentation that is focused on the content and
order of the arguments (what to say) as well as subliminal
persuasion employing non-rational argumentation, i.e. body
language-based argumentation (how to say it). To this end,
we present a novel multimodal dialog system in which two
embodied virtual agents discuss a specific (controversial)
topic through synthetic speech and emotions. The what-
to-say component of the two agents is based on a logical
argumentation strategy that was optimized beforehand in
self-play based on objective quality criteria for effective
argumentation [16]. In contrast, the persuasive power of
the how-to-say component reflected by the agents’ body
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language is adapted during the interaction with the user.
In particular, the user may provide explicit feedback on
whether he or she finds the presentation convincing, not
convincing or has a neutral opinion about it. By allowing
users to tune the how-to-say component of the agents, we
enable them to explore the impact of subliminal cues on the
persuasive power of arguments in order to raise awareness
that people get influenced by adapted behavior.
In Sect. 2, we give an overview of the research of per-
suasion. Sect. 3 describes the overall approach, a new for-
malization of the merged learning approach and a thorough
overview of the currently employed logical and non-logical
policies, while Sect. 4 shows the results at the current stage
of the research.
2 Research of Persuasion
2.1 General Theory
The theory of persuasion goes back to the Greek philoso-
pher Aristotle, who identified three means of persuasion,
that are (1) logos (the logical and rational aspects, i.e., the
content), (2) pathos (the emotional engagement between
persuader and persuadee) and (3) ethos (the persuader’s
personality and character) [11].
Psychological persuasion models developed by Petty
et al. [12] (Elaboration Likelihood Model – ELM) and
Chaiken et al. [3] (Heuristic-Systematic Model – HSM)
describe the influence of information processing on the re-
sult of persuasive messages. A persuasive message can be
processed via two different cognitive routes, namely cen-
tral and peripheral processing. Central processing focuses
on the content of the message communicated by the per-
suader/agent, while peripheral processing focuses on the
expression of the agent. However, people do not process in-
formation in isolation via the central or peripheral route [3].
Instead, peripheral processing is always carried out, in ad-
dition to which, if an elaboration threshold is reached,
central processing also takes place. In this situation, the
two processing paths are used with different intensities
depending on the audience’s “need for cognition” [12].
2.2 Non-verbal Signals and Persuasion
The persuasive effect of non-verbal signals in Human-
Agent-Interaction has extensively been investigated. For
instance, it has been shown that robots using non-verbal
cues (body language, gaze, ...) are perceived as more per-
suasive than the ones not using them. Examples are given
by Chidambaram et al. [4], who compared the effect of
non-verbal cues (gesture, gaze, ...) to vocal cues showing
a higher persuasive effect for non-verbal cues. Further,
Ham et al. [6] observed that gazing increased the persua-
sive effect more than using gestures alone did. Also, it has
been found by Andrist et al. [1] that practical knowledge
and rhetorical ability can affect the persuasive effect. The
EASI theory (Emotion As Source of Information, Kleef et
al. [23]) states that both intra- and interpersonal influences
of emotions exist, i.e. the persuadee’s own emotions can
affect the outcome of a persuasive message as well as
the emotions of the persuader conveying the persuasive
message. According to this theory, two different processes
exist, namely inference and affective reaction. In addition
to that, two moderator classes determine which of these
two processes takes precedence: appropriateness and in-
formation processing. The latter one depends, similar to
the ELM, on the motivation and ability of the persuadee
to engage in thorough information processing (epistemic
motivation). Studies have proven this theory and shown
that people use the emotions of the source as an infor-
mation channel when forming their own attitudes [24].
In accordance with this, DeSteno et al. [5] showed that
persuasive messages are more successful if they are framed
with emotional overtones that correspond to the emotional
state of the recipient.
The whole argumentation of Brexit shows that the peo-
ple’s opinion is strongly driven by emotions and not just by
the validity of arguments. There is also evidence from the
literature that the perceived persuasiveness of arguments de-
pends largely on emotions. We, therefore, felt encouraged
to focus on emotions as a major component of subliminal
persuasion.
3 Concept and Approach
In the following, we present an overview of our approach
and provide a formal description of the overall concept at
a high level (see Sect. 3.1) as well as a thorough discussion
of the two employed policies: (1) Policy emotion for emo-
tional behavior generation (see Sect. 3.2.2) and (2) policy
argument for the argumentation strategy (see Sect. 3.2.1).
For every interaction step t , each agent selects an ut-
terance (one after the other) as well as a corresponding
emotion and presents it to the user based on its learned
merged policy (see Def. 4). The user provides the agents
with feedback, which is used to optimize the policy (here
only emotion, see Fig. 11) based on Reinforcement Learning
(RL).
1 Freely available for non-profit academic research https://charamel.
com/.
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Fig. 1 Overview of our ap-
proach with two virtual agents1
debating about a controversial
topic employing a pre-trained
logical strategy argument as well
a dynamically learned behav-
ior strategy emotion adapted to
the user/persuadee based on
user’s explicit feedback how
convincing an argument is per-
ceived (convincing, neutral,
not convincing). This system is
an extension of the rule-based
approach presented in [18] (in-
cluding trained logical strategy)
and the adaptation approach
(without trained logical strategy)
presented in [28]
Set of emotions
arg emotion
policy emotionpolicy argument
debate
Persuadee
feedback
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arg + emotion
Set of arguments
3.1 Formalization
Formally, our approach can be described as Markov Game
with i players (here: 2) as 5-tuple .I;S;A;R;T /, where I
defines the set of players, S defines the merged state space,
A the joint action space and R the joint reward function
and T W S  A  S ! Œ0,1 determines the transition
function as follows [2]:
Definition 1 (Merged State Space) Let Semotion be the sub
state space in order to determine the next emotion and
Sargument the sub state space for determining the next ar-
gument, then the system’s merged state space S is defined
as
S W= Sargument  Semotion (1)
Definition 2 (Joint Action Space) Let Aemotion;i be the emo-
tion sub action space and Aargument;i the argumentation sub
action space for player i 2 I, Further, let Ai W= Aemotion;i 
Aargument;i be the respective merged action space for player
i 2 I, then the joint action space is defined as
A W= i2IAi (2)
Definition 3 (Joint Reward Function) Let the function
Remotion;i W S  A  S ! R be the reward given for
the emotional part and Rargument;i W S  A  S ! R be
the reward given for the rational part for player i 2 I.
Further, let Ri W= Remotion;i  Rargument;i be the respective
merged reward function, then the joint reward function R
is defined as
R W= i2IRi (3)
Definition 4 (Joint Policy) Let emotion;i be the emotion pol-
icy and argument;i be the argumentation policy for player
i 2 I. Further, let i W= emotion;i argument;i be the respec-
tive merged policy with i W S ! D.Ai / the distribution
of possible actions given a state s 2 S, then the joint policy
is defined as
 W= i2Ii (4)
In the herein presented Markov Game, the agents se-
lect and execute their actions one after the other (and not
contemporaneously). Thus, we define an awaiting action
aw 2 Ai for every agent i 2 I who is not in turn. Further
we denote any state st 2 S (respectively action at 2 Ai )
for agent i 2 I at time step t as sit (ait ). It is further
notable that both agents have opposing goals, which is for-
mally called a zero-sum game. The optimum joint policy
 corresponds to a Nash Equilibrium, which means that
a change of any strategy i does not yield an advantage for
the respective agent if the policy of the opposing player is
kept stationary. It is important to note that the two state and
action spaces clearly differ in their size and complexity.
Since the argumentation policy argument;i should be able
to differentiate between all available arguments, a real-
time optimization (during the interaction with a user) is not
feasible. On the other hand, research has yielded different
objective quality criteria for logical argumentation which
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can be utilized in order to define an appropriate reward.
Since this is not necessarily the case for the emotional
policy emotion;i (due to subjectivity), it has to be adapted in
real-time and directly to the user response. Hence, we split
the learning process into two phases (pre-training and real-
time) and optimize the two parts of the policy  separately
at the current state of our work. Both learning phases are
discussed in more detail in the following subsections. The
Algorithm 1 sketches the general procedure during the
interaction.
3.2 The Policy
Since persuasion does not only depend on the content but
also the way, how a message is conveyed, the joint policy
 employed by the agents contains two merged sub-poli-
cies, that are argument and emotion as formally (high-level)
described in Sect. 3.1. In the following section, we give
a more in-depth overview of the two policies separately.
3.2.1 Learning of the Argumentation policyargument
A significant amount of research has been conducted in or-
der to formalize arguments and argumentation strategies in
dialogues (see for example [15] for an overview). Our ap-
proach builds on these results and utilizes a dialog game
framework tailored to persuasion in order to structure the
interaction between the two agents. The respective dialog
game can formally be described as tuple .L; D/, with L
alogic for defeasible argumentation and D the dialog sys-
tem proper [14]. Consequently, L encodes a formal repre-
sentation of the available arguments (including their rela-
tions to each other), and D defines the rules for the interac-
tion. This includes aspects like turn-taking, winning criteria
and allowed moves in each state of the interaction.
Within this project, we utilize the dialog game for ar-
gumentation introduced in [13], since it was motivated by
providing a flexible framework that still ensures consistent
dialogs. The framework allows for five different speech acts
which are claim(i ), argue(i , so j ), why(i ), retract(i )
and concede(i ) with i and j argument components
in L. The available argument components fig are en-
coded following the argument annotation scheme intro-
duced in [21]. This choice is motivated by the ambition
to combine the presented system with existing argument
mining approaches to ensure flexibility of the system in
view of the discussed topics. The annotation scheme al-
lows for three different types of components (Major Claim,
Claim, Premise). It is important to note that a Claim com-
ponent in the argument structure is not related to the claim
speech act in the dialog game since they are both part of
separate frameworks. In addition to the three types of com-
ponents, the argument annotation scheme also allows for
two relations between components that are support and at-
tack. Each component apart from the Major Claim (which
has no relation) has exactly one unique relation to another
component. We denote the set of arguments that can be
constructed from the annotated set as Args. The arguments
argi 2 Args have the form argi = .i , so j ) if i sup-
ports j and argi = .i , so :j / if i attacks j . Each
argument arg 2 Args refers to one of two existing stances
2 f+; −g of the topic. For the sake of simplicity, the Major
Claim is defined as arg0 = 0. The complete setup includ-
ing a discussion of an annotated structure and a preliminary
study on how the resulting artificial argumentation was per-
ceived by a human audience was presented in [17].
In the next step, the aim is to explore the freedom within
the dialog framework to optimize the logical strategy of the
agent. In order to do so, we focus again on a formalization
of the problem as a Markov Game which allows addressing
policy optimization as a multi-agent Reinforcement Learn-
ing task. The advantage of the Markov Game formalism is
that it does not depend on a pre-defined strategy or addi-
tional annotated training data, assuming that a formal re-
ward function is given. Moreover, it allows the agent to ex-
plore different (and maybe unknown) strategies instead of
imitating a human policy. The formal description can be de-
rived from the general formalism in Sect. 3.1 by excluding
the emotional aspects from the formal description. This is
possible since the introduced formalization assumes a sepa-
ration of the two aspects in the action and state space as well
as in the reward function and the policy. The utilized formal
translation of a generalized dialog game for argumentation
into a Markov Game was extensively discussed in [16].
The reward functions Rargument;i of both agents i 2 I are
currently based on the winning criterion of the underlying
dialog game for argumentation since it provides a formal
indicator for the outcome of the interaction. However, since
also the perception of the content is highly subjective, our
ongoing work is focused on including user feedback into
the reward and combining it with the formal aspects. The
complete pipeline, including two argument structures, the
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dialog game for argumentation, optimized policy argument
and a virtual agent were presented in [18].
3.2.2 Learning of the Emotion policy emotion
The sub policy emotion is – in contrast to the argumenta-
tion policy argument – learned during interaction with the
user. In order to enable the agents to adapt their behavior,
we employ Reinforcement Learning as it is a suitable tool
for real-time adaptation in human-agent scenarios as shown
in [20, 26, 27].
The policy emotion depends on the argumentation policy
argument since the type of argument (or at least the content)
defines what kind of emotion is the right one to be chosen.
Consequently, the sub-state semotion is derived from the ar-
gumentation sub action aargument 2 Aargument as described in
the following.
Definition 5 (State Space Semotion) Let aiargument;t = .arg/ 2
Aargument;i be the sub argument action with arg 2 Args
chosen at time step t for agent i 2 I, stan W Args ! f+; -g
the stance and rel W Args ! fattack; supportg the relation
of argument arg. Further let score W Args ! Œ−1,1 be the
normalized compound score of the sentiment analysis of an
argument. Then the sub state semotion is defined as follows
considering it is player i 0s turn:
semotion W= .i; stan.arg/; rel.arg/; score.arg// (5)
Definition 6 (Action Space Aemotion) The discrete action
space Aemotion consists of employed emotions, such as
happy, disappointed, sad, angry, which can be both dis-
played by facial expressions as well as gestures.
To this end, we employ the user’s feedback (convinc-
ing, neutral, not convincing) to compute a prediction of
the current user’s stance during interaction as introduced
in [28]. The employed prediction model is based on bipolar-
weighted argument graphs (BWAG) that assigns a weight
wi 2 Œ0,1 to each argument argi 2 Args, which is used
for computing the argument’s strength si considering the
strengths of its child arguments in the argument graph (see
Fig. 2).
The strength of the root argument s0 is finally taken as
the predicted user’s stance t (Def. 7) at time step t . This
approach has the advantage that the underlying argument
structure is taken into account for the learning process [28].
Consequently, the reward function Remotion is defined as:
Definition 7 (Reward Function Remotion) Let ft W Args !
f0.0; 0.5; 1.0g be the user feedback function defining how
convincing an argument is perceived by the user at time
step t – ranging from 0 (not convincing) to 1 (convincing).
Fig. 2 Sketch of a BWAG for an arbitrary argument m 2 Args having
two children k and k +1. The strength sm for argument m is computed
by a function g considering its own weight !m and the strength of the
child nodes sk and sk+1 (taken from [28])
Further let it W .f1; :::ft / ! Œ0,1 a function that maps
the feedback signals to a prediction of the current user’s
stance until time step t (see Weber et al. [28] for more in-
formation about the prediction model) with respect to agent
i 2 I, then the reward Remotion;i;t at time step t is defined
as:
Remotion;i;t W= it .f1; :::ft /–it−1.f1; :::ft−1/ (6)
with 0 = 0.5
While employing the user’s feedback directly as a reward
signal allows for quick adaptation, using a prediction of the
user’s stance allows for learning a more fine-grained strat-
egy depending on the actual outcome of the debate. This is
because the prediction model allows the agents to observe
their current position with respect to the opponent. The ad-
vantage of that kind of approach is that an agent can learn to
take over the opponent’s strategy when it notices that it cur-
rently holds the worse position. Further, argument-specific
and structure-specific information can be used to provide
more fine-grained information for learning. In addition to
that, behavior learning can be combined with fine-grained
logical strategies [28].
In the next step, we aim to explore the effect when adapt-
ing emotions to the listener in order to both verify that an
adaptation leads to higher persuasive effectiveness and to
raise awareness of the subliminal influence of adapted emo-
tions.
3.3 Dialog Example
To give the reader a better understanding of the overall
system, we sketch in the following a detailed example of
an interaction between both agents and the user.
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The herein presented dialog between the two agents con-
cerns the claim 0 = Marriage is an outdated institution2.
The stances are as follows:
(i) Left agent: 0 ! stan=
(ii) Right agent: :0 ! stan=
For the sake of simplicity, we assumed that the user is
against the claim (:0) and finds the right agent (agent
2) convincing, if attacking arguments are presented with an
angry emotion. The left agent (agent 1) is found convincing,
if the sentiment of the argument is negative. In all other
cases, a negative reward is given. Fig. 3 shows the example
dialog between the two agents.
The first argument given by agent 1 is presented with
a neutral emotion and, therefore, not convincing leading to
a negative reward for the agent. The next argument of agent
2 is an attacking argument and presented along with an an-
gry emotion and, therefore, found convincing. Why speech
acts do not require feedback since they do not contain any
argument, therefore, the reward is always zero. The fourth
argument is found not convincing due to the nature of our
fictitious user, while the last argument given by agent 1 is
found convincing again since the correct behavior is chosen.
4 Evaluation Results
In the following, we highlight the results of our research at
the current stage. As we split the learning process into two
phases, we discuss each of them separately.
Argumentation policy. For the argumentation strategy, the
combination of argument structure and dialogue game in
a multi-agent setup was evaluated in a user study [17] by
comparing transcripts of artificial discussions with human-
generated ones. In the course of the survey, each participant
answered questions regarding the logical consistency of the
dialogs, the argumentation strategy of the agents and the
naturalness of the interaction on a five-point Likert Scale.
The results showed that the agent-agent dialogues were per-
ceived as logically consistent but also a significantly higher
perceived naturalness of the interaction for human-gener-
ated dialogues. We concluded that the utilized methods are
generally suitable for our task (as they lead to cogent in-
teractions) but that the perceived low naturalness indicates
room for improvement in view of the perceived quality of
the argumentation.
In the next step, the Markov Game formalism was ap-
plied in order to explore the freedom of choices for the
2 Material reproduced from www.iedebate.org with the permission of
the International Debating Education Association. Copyright © 2005
International Debate Education Association. All Rights Reserved.
Fig. 3 Example dialog between the two agents showing different argu-
ments presented with emotions and the given feedback of an exemplary
fictitious human user
agents that is provided by the utilized dialogue game frame-
work. We evaluated the approach in a proof of principle
setup with a reward function for which the optimal policy
is known [16]. We trained a policy for both sides of the
discussion by means of RL for ten randomly generated ar-
gument structures in order to exclude topic dependencies
of the results. The trained policies were evaluated against
the known optimal policy based on probabilistic rules and
shown to lead to the expected outcome. We concluded that
for the investigated case, the optimal policy could be found
by means of the applied techniques.
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Fig. 4 Simulation results includ-
ing 95% confidence intervals
depicting the cumulative predic-
tion t showing a continuous
increase over time even for high
noise (taken from [28])
Emotion policy. We have evaluated the adaptation of the
emotional policy in a simulative setup showing that the
agents are able to increase their perceived persuasive effec-
tiveness (t , Fig. 4) by means of using the provided human
feedback signals even for high noise (as user feedback is
not deterministic) [28].
Further, we evaluated the prediction model in a user
study with 48 participants in order to verify its practical
potential, accuracy, and validity. For this purpose, the par-
ticipants were asked to listen to an agent, who brought pro
and counter arguments for visiting a hotel, and asked to give
direct feedback whether they found an argument convinc-
ing. This feedback was used to calculate the prediction t
of the user’s stance (see Definition 7). In a post-study ques-
tionnaire, the participants were asked whether or not they
like to visit the hotel. We then evaluated to what degree the
predicted user’s stance and the subjective decision match.
Table 1 and Fig. 5 summarize the results [28], which show
that the prediction model of the user’s stance is very accu-
rate making it a suitable measure for rewarding the agents
during the interaction, especially in the herein presented ap-
Table 1 F1 score for different prediction confidences
Confidence
Stance  60%  80%  85%  90%
0.67 0.73 0.77 0.86
0.62 0.70 0.80 0.89
Fig. 5 Model accuracy of predicted user’s stance depending on differ-
ent confidence values
proach because the agents can use this information to adopt
strategies of the opponent if they have a worse position in
the discussion.
5 Discussion of Limitations
There are two (potential) limitations that need to be dis-
cussed for the sake of completeness.
Argument content not considered in the emotion policy. In
Sect. 3.2.2, we presented the adaptation approach of the
emotion policy emotion. The RL state space (Definition 5)
was defined by a triple consisting of the stance, the rela-
tion and the sentiment score of the selected argument. So,
at the current stage of this work, the emotional policy is
quite independently learned from the argumentation policy
and the content of the argument is not considered at all.
However, there might be an interaction between the con-
tent of the argument and the expressed emotion. The issue,
however, is that real-time adaptation requires a small state
space [27]. Therefore, we limited the state space to three
dimensions. To include at least some content-related infor-
mation, we added the sentiment score, which, however, just
describes the negativity of the argument and not the direct
content. Assigning a single score to arguments describing
the content is to our best knowledge not possible. There-
fore, it would be necessary to include all arguments in the
state space so that the agent learns a policy that takes the
content of the argument into account. This would exponen-
tially increase the state space and is therefore not suitable
for real-time adaptation. Another possible solution could
be to add an assessment score describing the quality of
the argument by employing automatic quality assessment
techniques of arguments as recently proposed by Toledo et
al. [22]. In summary, additional research and studies are
needed to overcome this limitation or to show that the pro-
posed state space contains sufficient information to learn
a consistent emotional policy successfully.
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Perception of arguments depends on the agent’s focus.
Within the experiment to validate the prediction model,
all arguments were presented by a single agent in a user-
directed manner (uni-directional persuasion [8]). However,
there is evidence from the literature that multiple agents
overall appear to be more persuasive compared to single
agents in case of maintaining a consistent argumentation
strategy. This effect is notably increased by using vicarious
bi-directional persuasive agents [9] (in which one agent
tries to persuade the other agents and indirectly persuades
the observer of the dialog [8]). Consequently, one might
wonder whether the evaluated prediction model performs
equally well within the proposed multi-agent scenario since
the persuasive outcome could be different. However, we
argue that since our model depends only on direct user
feedback and since each argument (not just the whole
debate) would be perceived differently in the first place,
the user feedback received would be different, and thus
the predicted stance of our model would implicitly take
such effects into account. Nevertheless, it would be worth
conducting a follow-up study to verify this assumption.
6 Summary and Outlook
Within this work, we have provided an overview of the
EVA project that aims for synthesizing and combining dif-
ferent aspects of argumentation. Our proposed system is
comprised of two interacting agents that are represented by
virtual avatars. The argumentative aspects, addressed in this
paper, cover (1) the learning of an optimal logical strategy
within a dialog game framework from objective optimiza-
tion criteria and (2) a real-time adaptation of the emotional
presentation of arguments based on explicit user feedback
and a computed prediction of the current user’s stance over
time. Our results showed the predictive power of the pro-
posed prediction model and that the trained logical policy
performs comparably well as the optimal policy based on
probabilistic rules.
In our future work, we will explore different techniques
to implicitly estimate the persuasive effect of the presented
arguments on the user without explicit feedback based on
the approaches discussed in [19] and the prediction model
presented in [28]. Since argumentation as a whole is highly
subjective [10], we aim to extend the system to allow the
agents to adapt both investigated aspects (how and what) to
the user simultaneously in order to determine the most ef-
fective combination of the different aspects. Thus, we will
include a combination and simultaneous learning of both
aspects of the strategy. To this end, we will explore differ-
ent approaches, including function approximation and fine-
tuning of pre-trained strategies. Finally, we aim to com-
pare the respective outcomes with the ones achieved by the
current separated approach.
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